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This paper considers mathematical abstraction arising through a natural mechanism of the 
biological brain in which complicated phenomena are compressed into thinkable concepts. 
The neurons in the brain continually fire in parallel and the brain copes with the saturation 
of information by the simple expedient of suppressing irrelevant data and focusing only on 
a few important aspects at any given time. Language enables important phenomena to be 
named as thinkable concepts that can then be refined in meaning and connected together 
into coherent frameworks. Gray & Tall (1994) noted how this happened with the symbols 
of arithmetic, yielding a spectrum of performance between the more successful who used 
the symbols as thinkable concepts operating dually as process and concept (procept) and 
those who focused more on the step-by-step procedures who could perform simple 
arithmetic but failed to cope with more sophisticated problems. In this paper we broaden 
the discussion to the full range of mathematics from the young child to the mature 
mathematician and support our analysis by reviewing a range of recent research studies 
carried out internationally by research students at the University of Warwick. 
Introduction 
The term ‘abstract’ has its origins in the Latin ab (from) trahere (to drag) as: 
•  a verb: to abstract, (a process), 
•  an adjective: to be abstract, (a property), 
•  and a noun: an abstract, for instance, an image in painting (a concept). 
The corresponding word ‘abstraction’ is dually a process of ‘drawing from’ a situation 
and also the concept (the abstraction) output by that process. It has a multi-modal meaning 
as process, property or concept. 
Gray and Tall (2001) envisaged at least three distinct types of mathematical concept: 
one based on the perception of objects, a second based on processes that are symbolised 
and conceived dually as process or object (procept) and a third based on a list of properties 
that acts as a concept definition for the construction of axiomatic systems in advanced 
mathematical thinking. Each of these is an abstraction: a mental image of a perceived 
object (such as a triangle), a mental process becoming a concept (such as counting 
becoming number) and a formal system (such as a permutation group) based on its 
properties, with the concept constructed by logical deduction. 
Our purpose in this paper is to unite these various different ways of abstracting 
concepts in mathematics into a single construct by seeking an underlying mechanism in 
human thinking that gives rise to them all and then to review how this mechanism works 
successfully in some cases but not in others. 
How do Humans do Mathematics? 
We begin with a much more fundamental question: How does a biological creature like 
Homo Sapiens do mathematics? First, many individuals develop and build on each other’s 
work to construct a body of mathematical knowledge that is recorded in books and other 
products of human culture and shared with the community. Every individual develops from 2 
being a child who knows no mathematics into an adult who may learn to share the 
mathematical culture. Even mathematicians that created that culture also went through 
such a development from being a baby dependent on mother’s milk to becoming a 
sophisticated adult such as Plato, Newton or Einstein. This has profound implications when 
we analyse mathematical thinking in general and abstraction in particular. By gaining 
insight into the way that mathematical thinking develops from child to adult, we also gain 
insight into the mathematical thinking of adults and into the nature of mathematics itself. 
Homo Sapiens thinks using the biological structure of the human brain; hence 
mathematical abstraction in particular and mathematical thinking in general is built from 
the biological operations of the brain. The evidence shows that human brains, though 
exceedingly complex, are only able to concentrate consciously on a few things at once, 
requiring a mechanism to cope with the complication: 
The basic idea is that early processing is largely parallel – a lot of different activities proceed 
simultaneously. Then there appear to be one or more stages where there is a bottleneck in 
information processing. Only one (or a few) ‘object(s)’ can be dealt with at a time. This is done by 
temporarily filtering out the information coming from the unattended objects. The attentional 
system then moves fairly rapidly to the next object, and so on, so that attention is largely serial (i.e., 
attending to one object after another) not highly parallel (as it would be if the system attended to 
many things at once). (Crick, 1994, p. 61) 
In addition to filtering out information, there must also be a mechanism to enable the 
essential information to be held in the brain in an economical manner. 
Compression 
The mechanism by which information is held in an economical manner relies on a 
phenomenon that we term compression (after Thurston 1990): 
Mathematics is amazingly compressible: you may struggle a long time, step by step, to work 
through some process or idea from several approaches. But once you really understand it and have 
the mental perspective to see it as a whole, there is often a tremendous mental compression. You 
can file it away, recall it quickly and completely when you need it, and use it as just one step in 
some other mental process. The insight that goes with this compression is one of the real joys of 
mathematics  (Thurston 1990, p. 847). 
Compression involves taking complicated phenomena, focusing on essential aspects of 
interest to conceive of them as whole to make them available as an entity to think about. 
Although other species have such mechanisms to function in their own context, Homo 
sapiens has a tool that enables it to grasp a complex situation, reflect upon it at various 
different levels of sophistication and to communicate with others: language. The essential 
feature of this tool is to name a phenomenon as a word or phrase, to allow the name to be 
spoken when referring to that phenomenon and then to use language to discuss its various 
aspects and to focus on its various properties and its relationships with other phenomena. 
We use the term ‘thinkable concept’ to refer to some phenomenon that has been named so 
that we can talk and think about it. This can be any part of speech, and may refer to any 
phenomenon, such as number, food, warmth, rain, mountain, triangle, brother, fear, black, 
love, mathematics, category theory. The phrase ‘thinkable concept’ is, of course, a 
tautology, for a named phenomenon is a concept and is therefore thinkable. However, 
given the many meanings of the term ‘concept’, we choose to use the term ‘thinkable 
concept’ here to emphasise its particular use in this theoretical framework. 
Thinkable concepts are noticed before they are named. First various properties and 
connections are perceived in a given phenomenon, but it is only when these are verbalised 3  
and the phenomenon is named that we can begin to acquire power over it to talk about it 
and refine its meaning in a more serious analytic way. 
As an example of the development of a thinkable concept, consider the notion of 
procept itself (Gray & Tall, 1994). As we sat looking at data from children solving 
arithmetic problems, we saw how some children seemed to use number symbols both for 
counting procedures and also as thinkable ‘things’ to operate upon. Suddenly we realised 
that this phenomenon needed a name to talk about it and the word ‘procept’ was born. At 
this point it was just a word linked to a complicated phenomenon. But by naming that 
phenomenon, we acquired the power to think about it and talk about it to each other and to 
our colleagues. 
Whereas others had talked about a process becoming encapsulated, or reified, as an 
object (Dubinsky, 1991; Sfard, 1991), they did not have a name to talk about the elusive 
underlying concept that was both process and concept. Though our invention built heavily 
on their work, it moved it to a more sophisticated level. We can now talk about different 
kinds of procepts, including operational procepts such as 2+3 in arithmetic, which always 
have a procedure to produce a result, potential procepts in algebra such as 2+3x which 
represent both a general process of evaluation that cannot be carried out until x is known 
and also a concept of an algebraic expression that can be manipulated, and potentially 
infinite procepts, including the concept of limit (Tall, Gray, et al., 2000). We can go on to 
discuss how different kinds of procepts involve different kinds of cognitive advantages and 
difficulties and move the theory to a new level of sophistication. 
This typifies the way in which a complicated phenomenon (here operating with 
symbols as process and concept) can be compressed into a thinkable concept (here 
‘procept’) to allow us to think about the phenomenon in a more sophisticated way. We 
suggest that this is the underlying mechanism of abstraction to compress phenomena into 
thinkable concepts that enables human thought in general and mathematical thinking in 
particular to operate at successively higher levels of sophistication. 
Making connections between thinkable concepts 
Having considered the compression of knowledge into (thinkable) concepts, we now 
address the manner in which the brain connects them together. This is through a biological 
process called long-term potentiation, which is an electro-chemical modification of the 
links between neurons to favour those that are useful and build stronger neuronal 
connections (Hebb, 1949). All neurons have multiple inputs from other neurons and a 
single output (the axon) that passes electrochemical messages down its length and branches 
out to connect to other neurons. A particular neuron receives charges from other neurons 
and when it reaches a threshold, it fires down its axon. This occurs typically several times a 
second. Links that fire more often are changed chemically and are more easily fired for a 
time. This leads to the ‘recency’ effect, in which we continue to be conscious of more 
recent events and can sustain a continuous train of thought. If a link is repeated and put on 
a ‘high’, it may then be strengthened to such a level that it fires automatically, making the 
link essentially permanent. This process is ‘long-term potentiation’ that builds connections 
between thinkable concepts. It operates by a process akin to Darwinian selection in which 
successful links are enhanced and dominate others in the long-term (Edelman, 1992). 
The necessary corollary of long-term potentiation is that the brain can only think using 
either built-in structures, such as vision, taste, smell and their respective connections, or 
mental constructions based on previous experience. The successive experiences that we 
have therefore deeply affect the ways in which we are able to think at later stages. 4 
Homo sapiens shares a facility for learning through repetition that is common in many 
other species. Repetition can strengthen the connections in the brain to such an extent that 
repeated actions become routine and performable without conscious thought. Used 
properly, as part of a rich knowledge schema, such compression is a valuable and essential 
tool. Used on its own, to learn ‘rules without reasons’ without the subtleties of rich 
thinkable concepts, it is likely to lead to fragile knowledge that may fail as the situations 
become more complicated. 
If a child compresses ideas into thinkable concepts, this will build the tools to work at a 
more sophisticated level. If not the ideas may simply become too complicated to cope. 
Krutetskii (1976) studied the success of four groups (gifted, capable, average, incapable) in 
terms of their compression of solutions procedures and found that the gifted were likely to 
curtail solutions to solve them in a small number of powerful steps, whilst the capable and 
average were more likely to learn to curtail solutions only after considerable practice, and 
the incapable were likely to fail. Gray and Tall (1994) report a spectrum of different 
performances in arithmetic that they described as ‘the proceptual divide’ between those 
who cling to the comfort of counting procedures that, at best, enables them to solve simple 
problems by counting and those who develop a more flexible form of arithmetic in which 
the symbols can be used dually as processes or as concepts to manipulate mentally. 
‘Proceptual thinking’ occurs when counting procedures are compressed into number 
concepts with rich connections: knowing things like ‘4 and 2 makes 6’ so ‘6 take away 4 
must be 2’ and using these ‘things’ to derive new knowledge, such as ‘26 take away 4 must 
be 22 because 26 is just 20 and 6’. 
The compression of complex phenomena into thinkable concepts is a natural biological 
development. However, to trigger the compression requires a specific focus on relevant 
aspects of a situation: identifying salient features to sense an underlying phenomenon that 
is named and refined into a thinkable concept. Abstraction is the process of ‘drawing from’ 
the situation to focus on the thinkable concept (the abstraction) output by that process. This 
thinkable concept is then available to be used as in more sophisticated levels of thinking. 
Abstraction may focus on the properties of perceived objects and give them names that 
are compressed by categorisation into different levels of sophistication (Rosch, 1978). A 
child may say, ‘that is a “dog”, that is a “cat”, they are both “animals”’, and a whole tree of 
classification becomes possible. It includes individuals such as ‘Rover’ or ‘Tiddles’ 
through generic ‘cat’ and ‘dog’, which are both ‘mammals’, as are also ‘elephants’ and 
‘rats’, but not ‘frogs’, however all are ‘animals’, and so on. This kind of hierarchy occurs 
in geometry, studying categories of figures such as ‘triangle’, ‘square’, ‘rectangle’, ‘circle’ 
and classifying, for example, different kinds of triangle (‘scalene’, ‘isosceles’, 
‘equilateral’, ‘acute-angled’, ‘right-angled’, ‘obtuse’), seeing that a square is a special kind 
of rectangle and both are quadrilaterals which, along with triangles, pentagons, hexagons, 
and so on are all ‘polygons’. Each category is a thinkable concept. The study of the 
properties of these objects and the actions upon them (geometric constructions) builds 
eventually into a coherent theory of Euclidean geometry. 
Abstraction may focus on actions on objects, which leads through compression to the 
computable symbols in arithmetic, the manipulable symbols in algebra and symbolic 
calculus. The symbols are thinkable concepts that we can operate on with properties such 
as ‘even’, ‘odd’, ‘prime’. They provide the basis for and extension to wider concepts such 
as ‘fraction’, ‘decimal’, ‘rational’, ‘irrational’, ‘real’, ‘complex’ and algebraic concepts as 
expressions we can ‘factorise’, ‘simplify’ and equations we can ‘solve’. 5  
Eventually the focus may turn to the properties of mental objects, compressed through 
several stages until it is possible to formulate a concept definition solely in terms of set-
theoretic language and deduce further properties using mathematical proof. 
All of these cases show abstraction in action: focusing on relevant aspects and naming 
or symbolising them as become thinkable concepts, be they mental images of objects (eg 
‘triangle’), symbolism for a process compressed into a concept (eg 3+2 as a process of 
addition and the concept of sum) or for structures defined by a list of set-theoretic axioms 
(such as the complete ordered field    or the infinite cardinal    0). 
This formulates all forms of abstraction in neuronal terms as the compression of a 
coherent phenomenon into a thinkable concept. Within this wider framework, however, 
there remain significant long-term differences between abstraction based on perceived 
objects, abstraction based on actions and abstraction based on set-theoretic definitions. 
These differences are well represented in the research literature. 
Earlier Theories 
The distinctions between different forms of abstraction feature in a range of accepted 
theoretical frameworks. Piaget distinguished between construction of meaning through 
empirical abstraction (focusing on objects and their properties) and pseudo-empirical 
abstraction (focusing on actions on objects and the properties of the actions). Later 
reflective abstraction occurs through mental actions on mental concepts in which the 
mental operations themselves become new objects of thought (Piaget, 1972, p. 70). Here 
reflective abstraction is seen as an activity akin to pseudo-empirical abstraction, now 
applied to mental entities rather than physical objects. 
Skemp (1971) considers the fundamental human activities to be perception, action and 
reflection. Perception involves input from the senses, action involves output through 
interaction with perceived phenomena, and reflection is the process whereby we think 
about relationships between perception and action. Skemp (1979) talked about two distinct 
systems, ‘delta-one’ which involves perception of and action on the actual world we live 
in, and a second internal system, ‘delta-two’, whereby our brains imagine internal 
perceptions and actions and reflect on them. Here we have perceptions of and actions on 
objects with reflection producing a developing mental framework. 
Fischbein (1987) focused on three distinct aspects of mathematical thinking: 
fundamental intuitions that he saw as being widely shared, algorithms that give us power 
in computation and symbolic manipulation, and the formal aspect of axioms, definitions 
and formal proof. 
Bruner (1966) focuses on three modes of operation: enactive, iconic and symbolic, 
which inhabit a similar theoretical discourse where embodiment relates to a combination of 
enactive and iconic while symbolic is subdivided into the symbolism of arithmetic and 
algebra the formalism of logical proof. 
Biggs and Collis (1982) built on the stage theory of Piaget and the modes of Bruner to 
build a theory of Structure of Observed Learning Outcomes in assessing the progress of 
students through successive modes: sensori-motor, ikonic, concrete-symbolic, formal, and 
post-formal. Within each mode there were cycles of performance—unistructural, multi-
structural, relational, extended abstract—which Pegg & Tall (2005) related to cycles of 
concept construction, dealing with one aspect, several separate aspects, related aspects, 
then the whole idea. They referred to this as a ‘fundamental cycle of concept construction 
and noted this occurring in process-object encapsulation through a single procedure, 6 
several procedures (with the same effect), a process (producing the required effect possibly 
by several different procedures) and a procept. 
The levels of success in achieving the compression of a complicated situation into a 
thinkable concept can be formulated in general using this fundamental cycle: focusing on 
an isolated aspect of a situation, encompassing several aspects without grasping their 
relationships, relating several aspects, grasping the situation as a whole. 
In this way SOLO taxonomy encompasses the analysis of learning outcomes, both in 
terms of the long-term growth of different modes of operation and also the local cycles of 
abstraction in which complicated phenomena are compressed into thinkable concepts. 
There are many differences between each of these theories and it would be highly 
inappropriate to attempt to combine them into a single theory. However, there are 
underlying themes that relate to the natural growth of mathematical thinking.  
Gray and Tall (2001) reviewed a range of these theories and hypothesised that 
elementary mathematical thinking builds by focusing on objects (for instance, in 
geometry), and on operations on objects represented as symbols (in arithmetic, algebra, 
etc) that operate dually as process and concept. At a later stage, in advanced mathematical 
thinking, the focus changes to the properties (of objects and operations) formulated set-
theoretically as fundamental axioms for mathematical theories. 
Based on these ideas, Tall (2004) formulated three distinct ‘worlds of mathematics’: 
the conceptual-embodied (based on perception of and reflection on properties of objects); 
the proceptual-symbolic that grows out of the embodied world through action (such as counting) 
and symbolization into thinkable concepts such as number, developing symbols that function both 
as processes to do and concepts to think about (procepts); 
the  axiomatic-formal (based on formal definitions and proof) which reverses the sequence of 
construction of meaning from definitions based on known concepts to formal concepts based on set-
theoretic definitions.  (Tall, 2004, quoted from Mejia & Tall, 2006) 
This framework is consistent with the research we have performed over recent years in 
our studies of the development of the individual from the young child to the sophisticated 
adult. Gray and Pitta (1996) consider the way that more successful children focus on the 
subtle compression of knowledge of arithmetic while less successful children remain 
fixated on the more visible complication of the physical detail. Tall, Gray et al. (2001) look 
at the long-term growth of procepts through arithmetic, algebra, calculus, and on to formal 
definitions in terms of properties and proof. Tall (1999) considers the distinct forms of 
proof available as the child develops cognitively from physical interaction with the world, 
through thought experiments, the properties of procepts proved by calculation and 
manipulation and on to formal proof as a mathematical expert. Tall (2002) reviews the 
calculus in terms of an embodied enactive-iconic approach manipulating graphs, symbolic-
proceptual representations (manipulating formulae) and formal proof (in analysis). Tall, 
Gray et al. (2000) focus on the development through the proceptual-symbolic world and 
the transition to the axiomatic formal world that reveals a bifurcation between conceptual 
and procedural thinking occurring because of different levels of success in compressing 
procedures into thinkable concepts. All of these papers are available on the web 
(www.davidtall.com.papers and www.eddiegray.co.uk). 
Recent data from around the world 
Recent work with our own research students collecting data from around the world in 
Britain, Malaysia, Turkey, Brazil has further studied concept formation at various stages of 7  
mathematical development of the individual. These reveal in many cases the desired 
abstraction of thinkable concepts often does not occur as required, with many students 
remaining at a fragile procedural level of operation. This has long-term consequences for 
the successful teaching of mathematics at all levels. 
The development of early arithmetic 
Early arithmetic evolves from actions of manipulating and counting collections of 
objects. It involves repeating and refining the action-schema of counting, until it becomes 
apparent that the effect of a counting procedure on a given set always gives the same 
number word leading to the thinkable concept of number. The addition of two numbers 
begins by putting two sets together and counting the combination by various counting 
procedures with a symbol such as 3+2 evoking either a process of addition or the concept 
of sum, 3+2, which is 5. 
In any context that involves an action on objects, the individual has the possibility of 
attending to different aspects of the situation: a theme that Cobb, Yackel and Wood (1992) 
see as one of the great problems in learning mathematics. In the terms of our framework 
the essential question is whether the child focuses on the actions of counting leading to a 
procedural interpretation or is able to contemplate the effect of those actions in terms of 
thinkable number concepts. 
The greater majority of young children count (and so do many adults). For a young 
child, counting can be seen as part of a stage in concept development. However, an older 
child’s extensive reliance on counting may be the result of necessity. Counting procedures 
that work with small numbers—such as calculating 8+3 by counting-on three after 8—are 
no longer practicable in dealing with larger numbers such as 855+379. Learned routines 
may be used without meaning and—when they lead to error—confusion and alienation 
may ensue. Pitta (1998) obtained data illustrating that children who succeed naturally focus 
on compressed number concepts to perform arithmetic tasks, while children who fail often 
focus on other aspects of what they see. A child looking at the picture   in a 
mathematical way may see it representing the fraction one half (the black or white parts of 
the square). Another child may see it as the doors of a lift or even an open window at night 
with a white curtain. As children grow older, some focus on the powerful use of number 
symbols as compressed thinkable concepts, some can combine both embodiment and 
symbolism in flexible ways, but others remain trapped in an increasingly complicated 
world of fragile procedures. 
Is it possible to help those who are struggling with counting procedures unable to cope 
with more sophisticated problems? Gray and Pitta (1997) worked with an eight-year-old 
child who had difficulty counting on her fingers and instead used mental images of 
counters in specific arrays to perform arithmetic calculations with small numbers. They 
provided her with a graphical calculator and tasks to perform such as ‘find a sum whose 
answer is 9’. Trying 5+3 gave 8, but adding another 1 gives 5+3+1 is 9. The essential 
facility of the graphic calculator is that it shows both the arithmetic expression and the 
result without the need for counting, allowing the focus of attention to be shifted from long 
procedures of counting which are no longer required to the visible relationships in 
arithmetic displayed on the screen. She found combinations such as 4+5, 3+6, 4+4+1, 
3+4+2 and as she did so, she began to see number patterns. Slowly her activities no longer 
depended totally on counting. As she worked through the programme, she became more 
adventurous, building sums such as   2+9+16= 6,    90804= 6,    30159= 6, 
   5+2019= 6,    40305=5,     10+30302=8. Over ten weeks of exploration 8 
she became comfortable with larger numbers and using number patterns. At the end of the 
course she was asked what “4” meant to her, and she replied “a hundred take away ninety-
six.” Not only had she become familiar with number relations in a way highly unusual for 
a ‘slow learner’, she had developed a quality that is usually only shown by much more able 
children: a sense of humour with numbers. 
However, such remediation has not proved successful in other cases. Howat (2005) 
found that there were failing students in arithmetic with a median age of 8.5 who were 
unable to cope with place value because they had not constructed the concept of ‘ten’ as a 
thinkable concept that could be ten ones or one ten. Without this they were overwhelmed 
by the problem of coping with the arithmetic of two digit numbers since their response to 
any problem was to attempt counting on in ones.  Even when working closely with them, 
Howat found that some had cognitive difficulties that started far back in their development 
that were deeply ingrained and seemed no longer subject to her remedial action. 
The Ambiguous Number Line 
The shift to number as measurement is embodied using a number line. In the English 
National Curriculum, this is intended to give learners an overall picture of numbers in 
order on a line as part of a long-term development of successive abstractions, from a line 
drawn with pencil and ruler, to a mental image of an arbitrarily long line with no thickness 
that is subdivided to imagine fractions, finite decimals, then infinite decimals and 
eventually to the formal thinkable concept of the real numbers as a complete ordered field. 
It is a journey that is made by those who become mathematicians, but the initial path 
proves stony for many young children in school. 
In English Primary Schools (for children of median ages 4.5 to 10.5), the number line 
is introduced as a key classroom resource within the Primary National Strategy (PNS) in 
the Framework for Teaching Mathematics (DfEE, 1999). It begins with a ‘number track’ 
consisting of blocks placed one after another to count in order, then moves on to a number-
line in several different guises including a ‘washing line’ of numbers, table-top number 
lines, some marked with specific numbers, others left open to place the numbers in an 
appropriate place. The overall aim is to use these representations to promote the 
understanding of the number sequence and order of the whole numbers marked on the line, 
introducing addition and subtraction in terms of operations on lengths, then later expanding 
the children’s knowledge to include fractions, decimals and negative numbers. 
Within the documentation there is no reference to the conceptual differences between a 
discrete number track and a continuous number line, or to the subtle shifts in meaning 
involved in the introduction of broader number concepts. 
This ambiguity is reflected in schools by the way in which teachers interchangeably 
use the terms number line and number track as if they are the same idea, when they are not. 
The number track consists of discrete numbers, one, two, three, … with each number 
followed by a next number and no numbers in between. The number line is a continuous 
line on which we may mark numbers as points, with fractions between whole numbers and 
the possibility to extend the line in either direction to include positive and negative 
numbers, rationals, decimals, and so on.  
When Doritou (2006) interviewed a range of children with median ages between 6.5 
and 10.5, most of them simply described the number line in terms of some perceptual 
features of a particular line or explained a particular line in the context of an action. 
Overall, the quality of the children’s responses did not change significantly between 
children in Year 3 (aged 7.5) and those in Year 6 (aged 10.5). There was an over-riding 9  
preference to label calibrated lines with whole numbers and a limited acknowledgement 
that an interval could be subdivided, linking back to their experiences with the number 
track rather than the intended number line. 
When the teachers came to use what they perceived as a number line to demonstrate 
the subdivision of intervals for fractions and decimals, most children carried an 
embodiment pre-loaded with prior active, linguistic and relational experience with whole 
number. There was no sense of the conceptual structure that underscores the use of the 
number line as an ideal representation for connecting whole number and fraction (Baturo 
& Cooper, 1999). 
Procedural conceptions of fraction 
After the initial challenges of handling whole numbers, the shift to handling fractions is 
a problematic one for many children. Instead of a single name for a single number, like ‘3’, 
a fraction has many names: ‘two-thirds’, ‘four-sixths’, ‘sixteen twenty-fourths’. A fraction 
begins as an embodied activity of breaking an object or collection into equal parts and 
assembling the required number of parts. Whereas two-thirds, four-sixths and sixteen-
twenty-fourths involve quite different procedures and produce parts of different sizes, the 
quantity in each case is the same. The major act of abstraction shifts attention from the 
sharing procedure as a sequence of steps to the effect of that procedure, namely the 
quantity produced in the result. Focusing on the effect, one-third is the same as three-
sixths. If fractions are seen as procedures, then addition is almost too complicated to 
contemplate, but if fractions with the same effect are seen as ‘the same’ then adding one-
third and one-half is the same as adding two sixths and three sixths, a process not unlike 
adding two apples and three apples. The child with proceptual flexibility of number is 
more likely to see the essential simplicity of adding fractions than the child with a 
procedural view that may involve learning complicated rules which may have little 
meaning, such as ‘put the fractions over a least common denominator’. 
As part of the Malaysian Vision for 2020 to develop the country’s economy to the 
highest standards by that date, the Malaysian curriculum is designed to teach fractions in a 
caring and helpful way to include such things as seeing that multiplication can be done in 
different ways to give the same result. For instance, ‘two-fifths of twenty-five’ can be 
performed either by working out a fifth of twenty-five, which is five, then multiply by two, 
to get ten or by multiplying two times twenty-five to get fifty and divide by five, also to get 
ten.  
To ensure that all children can accomplish these tasks, a teacher encourages the pupils 
to remember the procedures, reciting successive parts of the procedure and inviting the 
children to fill in missing words. For instance, the teacher might say (in Bahasa Malay), 
‘How do we work out two-fifths of twenty five?’ and draw three circles on the board one 
above the other for numerator and denominator of the fraction, the other for the whole 
number. ‘What do we put in the top circle? The nu…’ to which the class gleefully says ‘the 
numerator.’ ‘What do we put in the bottom circle? The de…’ ‘Denominator’. ‘Of means 
mul…’, ‘multiply’, and so the lesson continues, building up the ritual of the procedure of 
multiplication by a fraction. 
In a study observing the classroom and interviewing the students, Md Ali (2006) found 
that children’s achievement in fractions was indeed improving, but that although the 
teachers subscribed to the aspirations of Vision 2020 to help children ‘really understand 
mathematics’, they general consensus was that they felt constrained by the teaching 
schedule and the need for success in the National UPSR Examination. Success in 10 
examinations was achieved procedurally with some degree of flexibility in choosing which 
procedure to use—but the compression of knowledge into flexible thinkable concepts to 
solve unfamiliar fraction problems proved elusive. 
‘Magic’ embodiments in algebra 
The shift from arithmetic to algebra involves an abstraction from the computable 
operations of arithmetic to the use of expressions representing generalised arithmetic 
operations. Such a transition proves relatively easy for some who have a flexible 
proceptual approach to arithmetic, but it is far more difficult for those who continue to 
think of expressions purely in procedural terms. Working with a group of committed 
teachers in Brazil, Rosana Nogueira de Lima (de Lima & Tall, 2006) found the teachers 
concerned with teaching their students how to solve equations. 
In linear equations, they elected to teach the students the principle of ‘doing the same 
thing to both sides’ to maintain the equality and manipulate the equation to give the 
solution. In practice the students focused not on the general principle but on the actions 
they performed. Subtracting 2 from both sides of the equation      3x+2=8 and simplifying 
to      3x =82 was soon seen as ‘change sides, change signs’ while the final simplification 
of      3x = 6 by dividing both sides by three to get 
     
x = 6
3
 soon became ‘move the 3 over 
the other side and put it underneath’. The students interpreted these moves in an embodied 
way, ‘picking up the terms and putting them somewhere else’ with additional actions such 
as ‘change signs’ or ‘put it underneath’. This ‘procedural embodiment’, carried out by 
mentally moving the terms with an additional meaningless piece of ‘magic’ to get the right 
answer was used successfully by some but proved fragile for others who made errors 
mixing up the rules such as shifting the 3 in      3x = 6 with the additional magic of ‘changing 
signs’ to get
     
x =
6
3
. Such errors may increase the confusion of students who may then try 
alternatives to get the correct answer, producing what appear to be random errors. 
In solving quadratics, the problems became worse as the teachers, knowing the 
difficulties with linear equations, focused only on teaching the formula because it gives a 
solution for any quadratic. However, this single procedure lacks flexibility and it is often 
necessary to manipulate the equation to get it into a form to use the formula. A problem 
arose when the students were asked to show that the equation      (x2)(x3) = 0 had roots 
2, 3. Most students failed to respond at all and those that did attempted to multiply out the 
brackets to solve the equation using the formula. Few succeeded. 
Here we see lack of flexibility in abstracting thinkable concepts has a cumulative 
effect. Some students see the essential simplicity of an algebraic expression as a potential 
calculation that can be manipulated in its own right and develop an effortless mastery of 
algebra. Meanwhile others who focus on procedures become entrapped in more 
complicated activities that increase the cognitive strain and may become unmanageable. 
Complications in the function concept 
As we move through into the secondary curriculum we come to concepts like the 
notion of function, which the NCTM standards see as being an essential underpinning of a 
wide range of mathematics. In some countries, such as Turkey, the function concept is 
taught from its set-theoretic definition and seen as a fundamental foundational idea. It is 11  
quite simple. There are two sets A and B and for each element x in A, there is precisely one 
corresponding element y in B which is called    f (x) (eff of eks). That’s it! 
However, this is used in the curriculum to weave a huge web of knowledge: linear 
functions, quadratic functions, trigonometric functions, exponentials and logarithms, 
formulae, graphs, set diagrams, and so on. How does one help the student make sense of 
this complicated array of ideas? Two routes are possible. One is to focus on the simplicity 
of the definition and continually link back to it to make powerful connections. Another is 
to look at the individual difficulties and teach the students how to cope with them. 
Bayazit & Gray (2006) reports a study of the teaching of two teachers with very 
different approaches. Ahmet saw his duty to mentor the students and help them make sense 
of the function concept. At ever opportunity, he emphasised the simple property that a 
function      f : A B mapped each element of the domain A to a specific element in the 
domain B. For example, in considering when a graph could be a function, he looked at the 
definition and related it to the fact that each x corresponded to only one y, and linked this 
to the ‘vertical line’ test. When he considered the constant function, he considered the 
definition and revealed the constant function      f (x)= c as the simplest of functions which 
maps every value of x in A onto the element c in B. Likewise, when he studied inverse 
functions, such as the square root, the inverse trigonometric functions and the relationship 
between logarithm and exponential, he patiently referred everything to the definition. With 
piece-wise functions, which were new to the students, he again used the definition to 
confirmed that these too satisfied the simple requirement that for every x there was a 
unique y. 
The other teacher, Burak, was well aware of his students’ potential difficulties and 
misconceptions. He considered that students rejected the constant function because ‘it did 
not vary with x’. He interpreted the students’ difficulties with the inverse function as an 
indicator of their inability to move back and forth between the elements of domain and co-
domain. He knew that students had problems with the discontinuities of the graphs of 
piecewise-defined functions, predicting that they would draw lines to fill in any gaps. 
However, he made no effort to eliminate these obstacles during his teaching. Instead he 
gave the students the details he considered that they needed to answer the examination 
questions. He taught the ‘vertical line test’ as a specific test for functions, practising 
examples to get it right. He introduced the inverse function with a simple case, finding the 
inverse of     y = 2x+3, by seeking to express x in terms of y, subtracting 3 from both sides 
and dividing by 2 to get 
     
x =
y3
2
 then interchanging x and y to get 
     
y =
x3
2
. He dealt 
with the problem of the constant function by affirming that a function does not need to 
involve x and that its graph is a horizontal line parallel to the x-axis.  He dealt with piece-
wise functions by showing students how to cope with particular examples. 
He would often indicate that an examination or test required particular tactics: 
If you want to succeed in those exams you have to learn how to cope. 
Do not forget simplification. It is crucial, especially [in] a multiple-choice test. 
Even though he was aware of student difficulties he did not attempt to address them 
meaningfully as teachers had done in other studies (Tirosh et al., 1998; Escudero & 
Sanchez, 2002). His students scored significantly lower than those of Ahmet who had 
concentrated on building the notion of function as a thinkable concept by linking the 
definition to many different function contexts such as set diagram, formula, graph rather 
than focus separately on how to cope with specific difficulties in different cases. 12 
Drawing Together the Threads 
The theoretical framework for the development of mathematical thinking through the 
compression of phenomena into thinkable concepts encompasses learning over a life-time. 
It begins with young children learning to count, which requires a process of mental 
compression of the counting-schema into the concept of number.  Arithmetic knowledge 
builds on operations of addition, subtraction, sharing and multiplication where the more 
successful student sees the symbols as flexible thinkable concepts that dually evoke 
processes ‘to do’ and concepts’ to think about’. Such students use old knowledge to create 
new and have the flexibility to formulate and solve new problems. The less successful stay 
more with their perceptions of the real world and their inflexible counting procedures that 
cannot cope with the increasingly sophistication of situations that they encounter. 
We have found the use of a graphic calculator representing both the arithmetic 
expression to be computed and the result of the computation can enable a child to focus on 
relationships rather than on the time-occupying procedures of counting, although serious 
cases of difficulty may not respond even to this remediation. Our framework suggests that 
abstraction of thinkable concepts by focusing on the proceptual relationships between 
numbers rather than the procedures of counting leads naturally to more successful 
operations with arithmetic. 
The physical representation of number as a number track, then a number line has strong 
perceived properties that encourages many children to cling to an interpretation of the 
number line as a counting and computational tool for whole numbers, so that they fail to 
grasp its measurement characteristics to recognise it as a visual and dynamic image of 
numbers beyond whole numbers. However, this occurred in a situation where much 
activity was provided without an apparent focus on the change of meaning from counting 
on a discrete number track to measuring on a continuous number line. We hypothesise that 
children learn from their experience and if that experience does not focus on the thinkable 
concepts required for more powerful thinking then that thinking may not occur. 
The procedural teaching of fractions, even though it improves performance on 
examinations nevertheless can leave the student inflexible and less able to cope with 
problems beyond the scope of the narrow framework taught so that success may be 
achieved within the examination. Again, the focus on different procedures in counting 
produces gains in accuracy and efficiency but does not extend so easily to more 
sophisticated problem solving. 
The shift to algebra requires a sense of the general operations of arithmetic, and we 
hypothesise that a child who is proceptual in arithmetic is more likely to have the 
flexibility of arithmetic symbols as thinkable concepts to carry over to the manipulation of 
algebraic expressions. Data to support this explicit hypothesis still needs to be collected. 
What we do have is data that a group of children taught by the principle of ‘do the same 
thing to both sides’ focus on the specific experience they see before them and solve 
equations by shifting symbols with a perceived ‘magic’ of changing signs or shifting the 
number 3 in      3x = 6 over the other side and ‘putting it underneath’. 
The case of the research on the function concept shows the positive way in which a 
gifted teacher can assist in the abstraction of powerful thinkable concepts by relating the 
simplicity of the definition to all its representations and relationships. Meanwhile the 
desire to focus on a host of specific instructions to pass the examination may be counter-
productive. 
What does the available evidence tell us? The overwhelming message is that the 
pressure to ‘teach to the test’ leads to the teaching of specific procedures that compresses 13  
the routine procedure into an automatic way of solving specific problems without 
necessarily producing the conceptual flexibility to think in a more sophisticated way. The 
‘natural process’ of the brain to focus on relevant data and to form thinkable concepts is 
here focusing on the steps of the procedure, not what the procedure is intended to do. For 
so many learners the focus is on the steps needed to perform column subtraction, long 
division or factorisation of quadratics. The procedure of factorisation turns      x
2 + x6 into 
     (x2)(x+3)  which can be seen as converting one thing into something that (looks) 
different. These two expressions are different as procedures of evaluation, but they are the 
same in effect. Being able to ‘see’ 8+6 as 8+2+4 and then as 14, or to ‘see’    
1
2 +
1
3  as    
3
6 +
2
6  
and ‘hear’ ‘three sixths and two sixths’ to get ‘five sixths’ transforms arithmetic 
procedures into flexible thinkable concepts. In the same way, ‘seeing’      x
2 + x6 and 
     (x2)(x+3)  as different ways of writing the same thing is a significant simplification 
that turns algebraic expressions into thinkable concepts that can be handled fluently. 
If at one stage a learner fails to focus on the relevant aspects to produce the subtle 
thinkable concepts and instead learns the steps of the procedure to carry out a specific task, 
then the human brain lacks the thinkable concepts to build on the sophistication required at 
the next stage and is more likely to resort to the primitive strategy of learning by rote. The 
effects are cumulative. As all of us go through the long-term development of learning 
mathematics, if compression of knowledge required for the next stage does not occur, then 
procedural learning becomes more likely, not only in the children we are teaching, but in 
those who are adults and have already been through their mathematics education. Thus, 
despite the widespread call for more meaningful conceptual learning, the perception that 
the way to learn mathematics procedurally proliferates and is held, not only by children, 
but also by many teachers, administrators and politicians. 
To improve long-term conceptual learning, the framework formulated here suggests 
that the whole curriculum must be framed with an awareness of the abstraction process to 
produce thinkable concepts at every stage. This requires the teacher as mentor to 
encourage children to focus on the appropriate essential ideas in a way that enables them to 
compress the phenomena into thinkable concepts. This in turn requires mathematics 
educators to aid the development of such a vision by working to formulate how this can be 
attempted in ways that make sense both to the teacher and the many different learners. 
This journey will not be easy. In the UK, the National Numeracy Strategy (DfEE, 
1999) was initiated as a response to low attainment in mathematics in many schools and it 
informed teachers, through its annual objectives that built new ideas on those previously 
taught, what should be taught in mathematics during each school year. It also explained 
how the mathematics specified should be taught by presenting a recommended three–part 
lesson format: mental/oral phase, main phase and plenary phase and advocated that the first 
and last phase, together with part of the main phase, should be taught with the whole–class 
together. While this strategy was not enforced by law, the majority of schools responded to 
the initiative, partly due to pressure from government agencies such as OfSTED (Denvir & 
Askew, 2001).  
In an evaluation of mathematics provision for 14 to 19 year-olds OfSTED (2006) 
reported that the majority of teaching preparing students for examinations by “teaching to 
the test” might ensure that students pass examinations but it would not ensure 
mathematical flexibility. The government report intimated that the problems arose from the 
inadequacies of teaching.  14 
Our theoretical framework suggests differently. We believe that the natural process of 
abstraction through compression of knowledge into more sophisticated thinkable concepts 
is the key to developing increasingly powerful thinking. It occurs naturally with the most 
able and others can be helped by using techniques that encourage a focus on the essential 
elements to compress into thinkable concepts. But there is no evidence that it can work for 
all children. Until we grasp the nature of the required sophistication to compress 
complicated phenomena into thinkable concepts and are able to express it in a way that 
makes sense to teachers, students and, if possible, to politicians, mathematics will remain 
for many a world of overbearing difficulty relieved only partially by limited rote-learning. 
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